|Prince / General|
Portrait of General Bagration by George Dawe
|Native name||პეტრე ბაგრატიონი|
"God of the Army"|
Kizlyar or Tbilisi (Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti)
24 September [O.S. 12 September] 1812|
Sima, Russian Empire
|Buried at||Borodino Battlefield, Russia|
|Allegiance||23x15px Russian Empire|
|Service/branch||Imperial Russian Army|
|Awards||40px 40px 40px 40px|
|Spouse(s)||Catherine Bagration nee Skavronskaya|
Dynasty: Bagrationi dynasty |
Brother(s): Roman and Alexander
Religion: Georgian Orthodoxy
Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration (Russian: Пётр Иванович Багратион) born Petre Bagrationi (Georgian: პეტრე ბაგრატიონი [baɡratiʼɔni]) (1765–1812) was a prominent general of the Imperial Russian Army during the Napoleonic Wars and other conflicts involving the Russian Empire. He was a descendant of the Georgian royal Bagrationi dynasty.
- 1 Biography
- 2 Napoleonic Wars in Europe
- 3 Finnish War
- 4 French Invasion of Russia
- 5 Bagration's tactics and doctrine
- 6 Honours
- 7 Pronunciation
- 8 Quotes about Bagration
- 9 Genealogy
- 10 Notes
- 11 References
- 12 External links
Bagration entered the Russian army as a sergeant in the Kavsansk Rifles, Astrakhan Infantry Regiment in 1782, beginning a thirty-year career in the Russian Army, and served for some years in the Russian-Circassian War. He participated in the Siege of Ochakov (1788). In 1792 he was commissioned as a Captain and transferred to the Kiev Cavalry Regiment that year as a second Major, transferring as a full first Major to the Sofiiskii Carabineers on 15 May 1794. He served in the military campaign to suppress the Polish Kościuszko Uprising of 1794.
He received successive promotions to Lieutenant-Colonel (26 October 1794), to Colonel (1798) and to Major-General (1799). His merits were recognized by Suvorov, whom he accompanied in the Italian and Swiss campaign of 1799, winning particular distinction by the capture of the town of Brescia. From 1798 to 1799, he commanded the 6th Chasseurs.
He commanded the Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard from 1801–1802, serving as GOC Jager Brigade (1802–05) and as the commander of the advance guard at Austerlitz in 1805.
In the wars of 1805 Bagration's achievements appeared even more brilliant. With a small rearguard he successfully resisted the repeated attacks of forces five times his own numbers at the Battle of Hollabrunn (1805), and though half his men fell, the retreat of the main army under Kutuzov was thereby secured. At Austerlitz (2 December 1805) Bagration fought against the left wing of the French army commanded by Murat and Lannes. He was promoted to Lieutenant-General in 1805, and fought bravely and obstinately at the battles of Eylau (7 February 1807), Heilsberg (11 June 1807) and Friedland (14 June 1807).
As a hero of the Napoleonic Wars he returned to St. Petersburg, to become the lover of Catherine, the sister of the tsar, Alexander I. A marriage was out of the question. He then married another Catherine, a relative of Prince Potemkin. She, however, soon left her husband for an interesting life as a salon hostess in Vienna (and sometime mistress of Metternich).
During the Finnish Campaign of 1808, by a daring march across the frozen Gulf of Finland, Bagration captured the Åland Islands, and in 1809 he led the Russian army against the Turks at the battles of Rassowa and Tataritza. In 1809 he was promoted to full General of Infantry.
In 1812, Bagration commanded the 2nd army of the West, and a few days before Napoleon's invasion on 24 June he suggested to Alexander I a pre-emptive strike into the Duchy of Warsaw. Though defeated at Mogilev (23 July 1812), Bagration led his forces to join the 1st army at Smolensk under Barclay de Tolly, to whom he ceded overall command of both armies on 2 August. Bagration led the left wing at the Battle of Borodino (7 September 1812), where he constructed a number of flèches- due to a shortage of engineer officers though, these were poorly designed. During the battle he received a mortal wound and later died on 24 September, in the village of Simi, which belonged to his aunt.
It is said that, while wounded, Bagration kept giving orders to the troops without knowing that the Russian army was abandoning Moscow. When he finally heard the truth, Bagration was so shocked that he rapidly stood up, totally forgetting about his grave wound. Such an act was too much for his severely wounded body and it quickly cost Bagration his life.
Napoleonic Wars in Europe
Battles of Hollabrunn and Austerlitz
In the course of the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon's defeat of General Mack's Austrian army at Ulm on 19 October 1805 led Kutuzov to consider withdrawing and uniting his forces with reinforcements arriving at Brünn. Kutuzov ordered Bagration to guard Vienna with just a single regiment in order to stall a possible French assault. The French marshals Murat and Lannes made a false armistice claim to position themselves near the Danube at Vienna. When the guards were distracted they rushed over the bridge to secure the town. Kutuzov was in hurry to unite his army with the Russian troops commanded by Buxhoeveden, so he needed a diversion to delay the French advance. Bagration then took command of the Russian army's rearguard to do so. His combined Russo-Austrian force numbered less than 7,500 men facing a foe more than five times the size. Bagration took up a position 6 km north of Hollabrunn, on the hill north above the small town of Schöngrabern, and formed a large line in order to make the French believe the entire Russian army stood before them. In fact Marshal Murat hesitated to attack and later even agreed to an offer from Bagration to negotiate an armistice, halting the entire French assault without informing Napoleon. This gave Kutuzov valuable time to save his army. When Napoleon found out what had happened he became enraged at Murat's obstinate behaviour and ordered him to immediately continue his attack on the enemy, ending the armistice on November 16. The vanguard of Lannes's and Murat's 45,000 men attacked Bagration's position numerous times and were repelled each time, unable to take the hill for about six hours. At one point General Bagration personally led counter-attacks, driving the French back. Even though his force suffered heavy casualties and total destruction seemed inevitable, Bagration managed to skillfully manoeuver his remaining troops out of the area and to unite with the rest of the Coalition army at Brunn on 18 November 1805. His actions prevented the Russian army from being cut off and destroyed.
Just two weeks later, on December 2, 1805, the opposing armies would meet at Austerlitz. This time Bagration assumed command over the Coalition army's 13,000 men strong right wing, opposing Lannes' equally strong French left wing. In the chaotic battle which the Russo-Austrian forces were losing to Napoleon's superior strategy and tactics, Bagration's forces were not an exception in suffering defeat. As most of the coalition forces started breaking or retreating, Bagration too ordered his men to retreat after he did not achieve any progress against Marshal Lannes (who had the support of elements of Marshal Murat's forces) even though his infantry fought bravely and fiercely. The battle was already lost. While Bagration saw no other option but to commence a strategic withdrawal, Marshal Murat refused Lannes' suggestion to further pursue him so that his corps didn't suffer greater losses.
Battle of Eylau
General Bagration demonstrated his skills as military commander particularly clearly during the brutal Battle of Eylau which took place in East Prussia on 7 and 8 February 1807 during the War of the Fourth Coalition. After destroying the Prussian army at Jena (October 1806), Napoleon was pursuing Russian forces under Marshal Kamensky. In a series of inconclusive clashes the French did not reach their ultimate goal of destroying the enemy, while the Russians successfully continued retreating. However on January 7, 1805 General Levin August, Count von Bennigsen assumed overall command of the Russian forces and carried out a successful surprise-attack on the French left wing against Marshal Ney and further against Marshal Bernadotte. Bernadotte managed to evade destruction by winning the Battle of Mohrungen (25 January 1807) and by retreating. Napoleon saw an opportunity to envelop Benningsen's unprotected left wing by instructing Bernadotte to keep retreating and allowing his army to cut off the Russians from their own retreat. By a stroke of luck, a group of Cossacks intercepted a French messenger carrying Napoleon's orders to Bernadotte and quickly reported to General Bagration. Bagration then informed Bennigsen, who immediately halted his offensive and retreated. The French pursued, and after several engagements finally confronted the entire Russian army at Eylau on 7 February 1807. Bagration occupied high ground a mile in front of the town, facing Marshal Soult's IV Corps and Marshal Murat's cavalry. The combined French forces assaulted the plateau, but Bagration's heavily outnumbered troops repulsed them. The general demanded bitter resistance from his men in order to gain time for Bennigsen's heavy artillery to pass through Eylau and to join the Russian army in its position beyond it. During the afternoon the French were reinforced by Marshal Augereau's corps and by the Imperial Guard, making up about 45,000 soldiers in all. Under pressure from greatly superior numbers, Bagration finally conducted an orderly retreat to join the main Russian army. Russian forces under General Barclay de Tolly covered the retreat. Even at that point, despite having amassed a huge force (including the Grand Armée's finest troops), the French were not able to achieve more than driving Bagration and his small force of valiantly resisting Russian infantry (which showed no signs of faltering morale, even against the French Imperial Guard) off the plateau. Due to Bagration's brilliantly executed manoeuvers, the Russian army was once again able to survive and to prepare itself for an upcoming battle.
In 1946 Soviet authorities renamed the town of Preußisch Eylau as Bagrationovsk in honor of Pyotr Bagration and of his remarkable skills as a tactician.
During the Finnish War from 1808 to 1809 Bagration commanded the 21st division of the Russian forces under Buxhoeveden. Not wanting to wait until Sweden had concentrated a large army in Finland, The Russian Empire took initiative and decided to take action. On the night of 9 (21) September (February 1808) Russian troops crossed the border to Finland and launched an offensive. Bagration's 21st division was forming the Russian center and moving ahead in order to quickly seize Hämeenlinna, Tampere and Pori. Under pressure of the swift advance, the Swedish forces began a hasty retreat to the depths of Finland and were pursued relentlessly. Bagration's men had to endure worst weather conditions, severe frost, snowstorms and forest debris. In addition the retreating Swedes were constructing obstacles and destroyed any possible food source as well as roads. Nevertheless, Bagration's division overcame those obstacles and took all objectives, Hämeenlinna on February 22 (March 6), Tampere on March 1 (13) and Pori on 6 (18) March 1808. Bagration managed to advance over a distance of 200 km and capture three cities in just eight days and securing the way to the Gulf of Bothnia. His manouvre split the Swedish forces in two, a northern and southern group, providing the Russians the possibility to strike each group one after another. Bagration correctly assessed the situation that the main Swedish force was in the north and intended to turn his division for an attack. But the commander in chief Buxhoveden foiled that plan by miscalculating the situation and assaulting the southern Swedish group, which had itself fortified in numerous fortifications, with his superior force, including the 21st division of Bagration. This allowed the main Swedish force to retreat unharmed to Oulu. Despite that Bagration himself still achieved success by capturing the strategically important Turku province. In September 1808 Bagration became ill and was forced to leave the theater of operation. He was keenly interested in the events and hastily returned as soon as he became fit for service again. Upon arrival he was appointed commander of the Russian forces defending the west coast of Finland.
Swedish assault on Turku
In September 1808 the Swedish command decided to land troops on Turku in order to distract attention from the northern Russian Front that threatened the Swedish main army and to secure the southern part of the west coast of Finnland. A 2,500 men strong advance guard arrived at the Aland Islands and from there departed for the Turku coast. Bagration made a timely response and quickly threw the Swedes back to the sea. The Swedish leadership decided to take Turku at all cost to be able to create a bridgehead for reinforcements. King Gustav IV arrived at the Aland Islands to personally supervise the operation. On 14 (26) September a Swedish vanguard of 5,000 men was landing on Turku. Bagration was carefully monitoring the enemy's activities and allowed the Swedish troops to set foot on shore before he commenced a full assault which destroyed the entire enemy force, leaving only a few who could escape with boats. By the end of 1808, suffering heavy casualties, the Swedish troops were in full retreat and the area of Finnland completely cleared of them. Despite those setbacks the Kingdom of Sweden was not ready to give up the fight.
Battle for the Aland Islands
In 1809 the Russian command had decided to take the war to the territory of Sweden in order to finally crush her army for the conclusion. The Russian army was divided into three operational groups, that of Pyotr Bagration, Barclay de Tolly and Peter Shuvalov. Bagration's 17,000 men strong corps consisted of 30 infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, 600 Cossacks and 20 guns. The main assault was to be carried out by him in one of the most daring marches in military history. His route suggested to enter the frozen Gulf of Bothnia from Turku, reach and capture the heavily fortified Aland Islands which was garrisoned by about 10,000 Swedish troops and finally continue on the frozen Sea towards Stockholm. Knowing about the great difficulties he had to overcome, Bagration carefully planned his campaign and managed to supply his troops with fresh food, warm clothes, ammunition and weapons. The expedition was ready on February 26 (March 10) in 1809 and began on the next day. The offensive against the Alands was carried out in five attack columns, four engaged in a frontal assault, while the fifth bypassed Aland from the south. The Swedish troops did not put up much resistance and rather planned to retreat to the Big Aland from where they intended to stop Bagration's advance. In order to do so the Swedish commander general Carl von Döbeln decided to enter negotiations for an armistice. Bagration however refused, convinced that the sole purpose of von Döbeln's offer was to delay his movements and after completing negotiations, ordered his troops to advance at an even faster pace. Fearing an encirclement general von Döbeln started abandoning the Aland Islands and being pursued by Bagration's troops the retreat quickly turned into a devastating rout, leaving a lot of ammunition, weapons and equipment behind. Bagration calculated an intimidation manouvre, ordering a 400 men strong cavalry detachment under major general Yakov Kulnev to pursuit the Swedes beyond their own shores. Kulnev managed to take the Swedish town of Grisslehamn, which was just 70 km away from Stockholm. This unexpected turn of events brought shock and confusion to the Swedish leadership and population as everyone was surprised to hear of Russian troops on Swedish soil. Stockholm was being fortified, an army quickly put together and sent to intercept an enemy which wasn't actually there. The plan worked out beyond Bagration's expectations as the psychological impact of Kulnev's little incursion into Sweden turned to be very decisive for the course of the entire war. Simultaneously the other Russian corps also reached their goals so that the Swedish side found itself in an environment of being forced into peace talks after losing all their claims in Finland. Gaining wide reputation for his actions in that conflict Bagration was promoted to full general of infantry.
French Invasion of Russia
During the early stage of Napoleon's incursion into Russia, Bagration commanded the 2nd Russian Army deployed close to Vileyka, Belarus. The French march on Vilnius intended to split Bagration's forces from Barcley de Tolly's, who assumed overall command. Napoleon would then destroy Bagration's 2nd army with a combined hammer and anvil operation conducted by the marshals Jerome, Davout and Eugene after he falsely assumed they ran into Bagration's army when it were only elements of general Dokturov's cavalry. Confusion, false assumptions and lack of information prevented the French from having a clear picture of the situation. On the other side it was not much better. Conflicting orders and lack of information had almost placed Bagration in a blind march straight into Davout's forces. Mud tracks, supply problems, weather and command dispute among the French gave Bagration enough time to join with Docturov and assume command over a 45.000 men strong force. With already losing a large portion of his troops to skirmishes, bad weather condition and diseases, marshal Davout didn't want to fight Bagration without Jerome reinforcing him. The French cavalry was defeated twice by general Platov so that they were kept in the dark. Bagration wasn't better informed with both sides overestimating the other's strength. Davout thought Bagration had some 60,000 men and Bagration thought Davout had 70,000. Bagration was getting orders from both Alexander's staff and Barclay (which Barclay didn't know) and left Bagration without a clear picture of what was expected of him and the general situation. This stream of confused orders to Bagration had him upset with Barclay which would have repercussions later. Even though Barclay de Tolly was given overall command as minister of war, Bagration was not subordinate under him since he was the older general. This is a reason why he constantly received orders from Tsar Alexander and Barclay at the same time.
Despite massive losses among the French, their rapid advance by force march towards Moscow repeatedly prevented de Tolly to establish a defensive position and was forced to retreat every time he intended to. The commander in chief refused to put up a fight despite Bagration's numerous urging. De Tolly's continuing resistance to give battle would later lead to his removal from his position.
Battle of Mogilev
The battle of Mogilev, better known as Battle of Saltanovka was Bagration's first defeat against the French after he suggested a preemtive strike to Tsar Alexander. His 2nd army got intercepted when trying to unite with Barclay de Tolly's 1st army and clashed with marshal Davout's forces which had the Dnieper river blocked. In order to break through the French lines at Mogilev Bagration sent the 7th corps lead by general Nikolay Raevsky against marshal Davout's 5 divisions. Davout entrenched 10,000 men in a giant line while having another 18,000 men in close proximity. He waited for the approaching Russians and set them under massive musket volleys and artillery fire when they came close enough. Raevsky continued to attack while leading his men up front. Despite great determination of Raevsky's men, the French managed to repel the attack along the entire line. Davout then mounted a counter assault which threw the 7th corps back and forced Bagration to retreat his army to Smolensk. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but Bagration misjudged the situation, believing he fought Napoleon's main army when it was only Davout's forces. This highlighted the poor communication between the Russian armies. Bagration fearing another attack, retreated to the city Smolensk and garrisoned there waiting for Barclay to reinforce him.
Battle of Smolensk
On August 14, 1812, the three marshals Murat, Davout and Ney crossed the Dnieper River on quickly constructed pontoon bridges. The plan was to race toward the city of Smolensk, taking it without a fight. Napoleon saw Smolensk as a vital supply and replenishment base from where he would march to the north to attack the rear of the Russian main forces under Barclay de Tolly. The town had also symbolic, religious importance for the Russian side. Unfortunately for the French, conflicting orders and a breakdown in communication had already led Bagration to disobey orders and instead of marching west, he occupied Smolensk to the south. By August 16, French forces found the city heavily garrisoned by Bagration's troops. He got further reinforced with the arrival of de Tolly's army. Napoleon, however, assumed the Russians would fight outside the city to avoid the destruction of historical monuments, which did not happen. The fight for Smolensk started on August 16, 1812 with Napoleon's forces of three corps capturing parts of the town's suburbs but being repelled soon after. Continuous artillery shelling set the town, which consisted of mostly wooden buildings, ablaze, but the French didn't manage to get past the suburbs and to the walls as they lacked ladders and other equipment. Inflicting heavy losses on the attackers, the Russian garrison was able to hold its positions. However, the widespread fire forced Bagration and de Tolly to abandon burning Smolensk on August 18, 1805. The battle ended inconclusively, with the Russian armies retreating and Napoleon conquering but as quickly leaving what was left of the city as it was of no use anymore.
From the very beginning of the invasion Bagration had understood that the Patriotic War was not an ordinary one, but rather a national war. Local citizenry displayed great bravery where they could against small French units particularly around Smolensk but also other parts of Russia. Sporadic attacks from small diversionary groups of lightly armed peasants caught Bagration's attention already earlier and he was fascinated about their determination and effectiveness. From then on he was convinced that only a smart cooperation between irregular forces and the regular Russian armies would be the only method to stop Napoleon's advance. His aide-de-campe vice colonel D.V. Davydov, commander of a hussar regiment, shared Bagration's views on a guerilla movement and proposed a possible course of action. Bagration approved the proposal but when presenting the plans to Kutusov, the commander in chief only allowed a very limited number of troops to be provided for such operations. Davydov gave his word that he would take full care and responsibility for the supplies and action of his troops, only dissatisfied about the resources he considered very insufficient, asking Bagration to give him at least 1,000 Cossacks. Bagration, as much as he wanted to meet his officer's request and carry out that operation himself, did not want to disobey Kutusov, replying: "I would give you 3000 of them to start with, for I do not like to act superficially, but I can not even speak about it; Knyaz has defined the composition of the group himself; it is necessary to obey." Afterwards Bagration wrote following instruction to Davydov:
To Vice-Colonel of Akhtyrsk Hussar Regiment Davydov.
After reception of this, take hundred fifty Cossacks from Major-General Karpov and fifty Hussars of the Akhtyrsk Hussar Regiment.I order you to take all measures to disturb the enemy and to endeavor to deprive it of supplies not only from flanks, but in the middle and in the rear, to upset transports and parks, to break ferries and to take away all remedies. In a word to tell, I am sure, that having made to you such an important allowance, you shall prove your quickness and diligence and that will justify my choice. You can send official reports to me at every convenient chance you have. Nobody should know about your movements; try to keep them shrouded in the most impenetrable secrecy. As to the foodstuffs of your command, you should take responsibility upon yourself…
Bagration than also wrote letters to General Vassilichikov and General Karpov of the allocations and general information about the best Cossack and Hussar units available. On the request of Davydov he provided the vice colonel a copy of his map of the Smolensk province and when parting wished the young officer best luck and also hoped for his success. His confidence would soon be emphasized when the guerilla movement developed wide scope. Soon, besides Davydov's movement, other groups emerged, that of General Dorokhov, Captain Fisher, Captain Seslavin, Colonel Kudashev and many others. These groups successfully struggled against the French, combining their activities with those of peasant guerilla groups. Bagration became the author of the first real tactical instructions for such activities and one of the founders of the Russian guerilla movement against Napoleon.
Battle of Borodino
Fearing that Napoleon might take the Smolensk Road to Moscow, Kutuzov ordered Bagration and his 2nd Army to the left while Barclay de Tolly was guarding the right with the 1st Army. Other than the 1st Army which was deployed on positions which were strong and virtually unassailable by the French, Bagration's army had no terrain advantage at all and his request to change to a more advantageous position was denied by Kutuzov. So he decided to create one himself by ordering his sappers to construct four big Redans, also known as the Bagration flèches, four arrow-head shaped, open-backed earthworks which arced out to the left en echelon in front of the Kolocha stream. When the battle started on September 7, 1812 with a massive cannonade against the Russian center, Davout sent two divisions against the flèches at about 6 am. His force of 25,000 men supported by 102 guns faced 8,000 Russian defenders with 50 guns. While advancing Davout's divisions were hit hard by amassed Russian artillery which was deployed on the other side of the Kolcha to support Bagration's lines and also Russian jager units that were deployed in front of the fortifications. The French troops suffered heavy casualties before they could reach their objective and the undertaking was about to fall apart when Davout saw his troops retreating and rushed forward to personally lead the charge. With the second attempt he managed to take the southern most flèche at 7 am. But in response Bagration ordered Raevsky and his 7th Corps once more to confront Davout only this time the French were struck at their flank and thrown back again for the second time. Napoleon already held Bagration in high esteem, calling him the best the Russians could possibly throw against him, but was surprised about the stiff resistance he offered. While he reinforced Davout with marshal Ney and Junot for a third attack, Bagration repositioned his troops and deployed his reserves, the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Curassier divisions. The 3rd Infantry Division was still held in reserve at Semyenovskoe for the possibility that the French might try to outflank him. Kutusov who observed heavy fighting at the flèches was sending the 2nd and parts of the 5th Infantry Corps with 100 guns from his artillery reserve, but their arrival would take one to two hours, what meant that Bagration had to rely on his own. Napoleon demanded to take the flèches at all cost and opened the third offensive with a massive artillery bombardment followed by a simultaneous infantry and cavalry assault. At first the French managed to occupy the right and far left flèche but were again driven out by Bagration's troops. Marshal Poniatowski, who had the task to envelope the Russians and strike Bagration's rear with his cavalry corps was also defeated by Tuchkov's 3rd Infantry Corps. The defenders restored their positions at 9 am. Failing for a third time Napoleon became furious and now also added marshal Murat to the operation, launching a fourth assault at 9 am. This time Napoleon's forces were not only able to drive Bagration's forces out of the flèches but also captured Semyenovskoe. By this time however, the 2nd and 5th corps sent earlier by Kutuzov for Bagration's aid finally arrived and Bagration threw all available forces against the French repulsing them completely from all occupied positions, inflicting heavy losses. After that three more French attacks were repelled in a row, general Tuchkov being killed in the fifth assault. Despite the mounting casualties, Napoleon continued to assault Bagration's position. His troops were hit not only by musket fire but also canister shots from artillery guns at close range. Heaps of corpses and wounded prevented cavalry and infantry to maneuver properly on the battlefield. Napoleon considered sending his elite Imperial Guard to bolster morale of his troops but hesitated not willing to risk it being torn apart as well. At noon, the French launched their eight' assault with around 45,000 men supported by 400 guns against the defending 18,000 Russians with 300 guns. Bagration decided to meet the attackers boldly what lead to a long and brutal melee fight, probably the bloodiest scene during the entire battle, described by the historian Buturlin as follows:
An awful combat took place, in which, on both sides, miracles of almost supernatural bravery were displayed. The infantry, cavalrymen, and gunners of both sides, having got mixed up together, presented an awful spectacle of the great bulk of soldiers struggling in private, furious despair.
Bagration ordered his entire force to counterattack, but was seriously outnumbered and slowly driven back. The French 57th Grenadier Regiment kept attacking the flèches even though it got almost completely torn to pieces by musket fire from all directions. Their courageous behavior earned two "Bravo" shouts from Bagration and it was then when the 2nd commander-in chief got struck by shell splinters to his leg. His subordinates quickly carried him to a safe place away from the fight while trying to conceal what actually happened but Bagration's lacking presence was soon noticed. Rumors of him being killed spread and the morale of his troops began to increasingly waver. Bagration, now unable to control the situation, insisted not to be moved from the field until the battle was decided, hoping for the success of the 2nd Cuirassier Division of general Duka. The Curassiers managed to defeat the forces of marshal Ney but the news about Bagration being hit quickly spread and brought confusion and morale collapse upon the 2nd Army. Its management broke down so that the Russian forces were starting to abandon their positions during that chaos and retreat from the overwhelming French assault. The Bagration flèches were abandoned and left to the French but it cost them a huge price. From the 60,000 French soldiers who participated in the operation, about 30,000 were killed or wounded. Russian casualties were also high but less. The battle however ended inconclusive, with both sides returning to their initial deployment zones. The battle would drain from Napoleon his last fighting capabilities and resources and finally force him to resign his plan of capturing Russia after entering empty Moscow.
Bagration's tactics and doctrine
Bagration, heavily influenced by Alexander Suvorov, was an innovative tactician who favoured mobile offensive warfare even though many of the battles he was engaged in with the French were of defensive nature. He refused what he perceived as obsolete positioning tactics and instead would give the Russian army strategic objects and tactical manoeuvers, always going for the quick confrontation, where speed and accuracy was most important to take any chance from the enemy to react, respond or even organize. This led to much tension and rivalry between him and general Barclay de Tolly, who was given overall command and relied mostly on the search for adequate positions to entrench and wait for the enemy. Bagration's applied doctrines were ahead of time solid, concepts for both offensive and defensive warfare as even his retreats were conducted in equally good and impressive fashion, given the sometimes impossible odds he was facing.
Bagration's strategic views defined also his insights about the character of tactical military action. It is possible to discern these insights, for example, by considering the famous order to the forces of the 2nd Western Army, dated June 25, 1812. In the order, written by Bagration with own hand, instructions were given concerning actions to be taken against the French armies if they invaded Russian territory. He wrote:
For us, it is necessary to attack them bravely, quickly, not to become engaged in shooting matches; artillery must fire precisely; irregular armies must try to surround their flanks and rear…. The regular cavalry attacks quickly, but as a part of concerted action, without dividing into small bodies. Squadrons must support each other in the attack, not forgetting to provide for reserves and flanks. The cavalry should be located under the chess order.
Attacks were to be conducted with troops formed in columns.
Commanders of Corps must try to turn all attention to attacking the enemy with bayonets, using columns, and to attack until the enemy retreats. The horse artillery should operate energetically, as should cavalry, but harmoniously and without the slightest confusion. It is especially necessary when the enemy has strong reserves and may frustrate our attacking forces; for that we must try to have our forces in columns and in readiness, and as soon as everyone is driven into flight, then the Cossacks must prick and harass them, with the regular forces in close and harmonious support.
Bagration recommended deployment of the forces in a battle array that was not too closely packed, but sufficiently so to permit soldiers to fell each other's presence with their elbows. In case of counter-attacks by enemy cavalry, Bagration advised the use of battalion masses and squares, or "carres". "When the enemy cavalry attacks infantry, it takes only a minute to form either a column closed on all sides, or a battalion in a 'carre'."
With the purpose of increasing the enthusiasm of armies, all attacks were to be made with a shout, and during the approach the drums were to be beaten and music to be played. Similar insights are reflected in a number of Bagration's other orders, instructions and letters. In particular, as the characteristic of his tactical perspective, the "Manual for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" may serve as an example. This document was prepared on the basis of the "Manual to Officers of the Narva infantry Regiment," authored by M.S. Vorontsov in 1812. According to military historian P. Simansky, Vorontsov's manual "was strongly influenced by Suvarov's precepts, and was appraised by the most favorite disciple of Suvarov, Prince Bagration; it was slightly corrected by him, as in some places it concerned only Narva infantry Regiment, and then in July 1812 it was dispatched to all units of the 2nd Army." The "Manual to Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" recognized the offensive as the fundamental form of combat. The principal manifestation of offensive combat was the bayonet attack, concluded with a vigorous pursuit of the defeated enemy. This manual considered in detail the question of action in separate lines and in columns and about conducting aimed fire. The necessity of maintenance by skirmishers of a close communication with their columns was specified; movement forward was to be determined only by an order of the chief of division or battalion. If it was necessary to operate on separate line in forests, it was suggested to hold a reserve behind one of flanks in order to have an opportunity to envelope suddenly the flank of a counter-attacking enemy.
Attacks by enemy cavalry acting in separate lines was to be met by fire, having permitted the enemy to advance to within 150 paces; after that it would be necessary to divide into small groups of 10 and to repulse the enemy by fire and bayonets until the approach of reinforcements. Upon approaching, reinforcements were to be redeployed from a column into square, firing on enemy cavalry from a distance of 150 paces. The "Manual" demanded that officers demonstrate constant care for their soldiers, to remind them of their duties and the oath, to explain what was required from them during military actions. Special attention was addressed to maintenance of trust in the virtue of "Russian bayonets", a spirit of boldness, courage and persistence in the fight. "Persistence and courage," declared the "Manual", "have won more battles than all other military talents taken altogether."
Dissemination of all rumors of disaster and panic, such as "we are cut off", were categorically forbidden, under a threat of severe punishments. It was specified in the "Manual" that: "Brave people are never cut off; wherever the enemy goes, turn your breast to follow and defeat him." Thus, in the field of tactics, as well as in the field of strategy, Bagration acted as an innovator, a convinced supporter of decisive offensive action. He doggedly introduced advanced tactics; he dispensed with obsolete positional tactics and applied tactics of columns in a combination with separate lines. Paying great attention to the value of offensive combat, Bagration at the same time did not reject the opportunity to conduct defensive operations. He creatively approached planning for his assigned tasks, applying such forms of combat as provided exactly the right answers to particular circumstances. His practical legacy offers experience rich in the conduct of offensive battles as well as the development and practice of waging both advance and rear guard fights.
Bagration was the unsurpassed master of organization of these extremely complex kinds of actions. It was not casually that at the most crucial moments of wars of 1799–1807, it was Bagration who was appointed to command the rear guards and advance guards of the Russian Army. The engagements, conducted by Russian armies under Bagration's leadership during the Italian campaign of 1799, and also the advance and rear guard combats during the Swiss Campaign of 1799 and war between of Russia and France in 1805–1807, belong among the finest accomplishments in Russian military art. Bagration built a process of education and training of soldiers on the basis of the system developed by A.V. Suvarov. He paid great attention to the training and education of troops to develop soldiers with courage and initiative, capable of carrying out orders quickly and skillfully.
Bagration constantly worried about soldiers' health, and that they were well clothed and be fed on time. S.G.Volkonsky, who during the Franco-Russian conflict of 1806–1807 was frequently was in Bagration's group, wrote:
... I visited several times an avant garde where many of my friends were serving at Prince Bagration's headquarters. The hospitable manner of the Prince with subordinates, amicable relations between themselves, harmony, cleanliness in tents, the fresh and pleased appearance of the lower grades—proved the Prince's good treatment and attitude toward them, and in all hearts the pledge of general trust in him.
While showing a concern for the soldiers, however, Bagration at the same time demanded the maintenance of high military discipline, considering it to be the foundation of military service. "In military service," he wrote, "the first objective is order, subordination, discipline, unanimity and friendship". First of all, Bagration was extremely demanding of himself. "...To execute the will of the sovereign, of the emperor and my commanders is the most sacred obligation which I follow and obey at every step of my service... I love soldiers, I respect their bravery, and equally I demand order and discipline." Armies under Bagration's command were always distinguished by high discipline and, in some sense, this was one of the main reasons for their brilliant victories over enemies.
On 15 October 1800, Bagration was granted the hereditary title of a Prince of the Russian Empire (Kniaz Bagration) by the Emperor Paul I. He was also appointed as a Knight of the Orders of St Andrew (1810), of St. Alexander Nevsky (1807), of the St Vladimir, 1st class (1809), of the St Anna, 1st class (1800), the St George 2nd class (1805) and as a Commander of Justice of the Order of St John of Malta (1800). He was further honoured with a gold sword of honour for bravery (1808). Bagration's foreign awards also included the Prussian Orders of the Red Eagle (1807) and the Black Eagle (1807), the Austrian Military Order of Maria Theresa, 2nd class (1799) and the Sardinian Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, 1st Class (1799).
Tsar Nicholas I had a monument erected in his honour on the battlefield of Borodino. The general's remains were transferred to the place where he had fallen and remain there to this day. The grave was blown up during World War II (reputedly, the local museum authorities only were able to save shreds of bone and cloth from the grave) but has since then been restored.
Joseph Stalin chose Bagration as the name of the Soviet offensive launched on 22 June 1944 that defeated the German Army Group Centre and drove the forces of Nazi Germany out of what is now Belarus. After the war, the Soviet Union annexed northern East Prussia, and the until-then German town of Preußisch Eylau—the scene of the 1807 battle—was renamed Bagrationovsk in his memory.
In Moscow, the Bagration Bridge, which commemorates the 850th year of the city is named in his honour.
The name Bagration is not pronounced // bag-RA-tion as many people think when reading War and Peace for the first time. English-speakers used to Italian names often pronounce it // bag-rat-SION, but in Russian it is pronounced [bəɡrɐtʲɪˈon]. The Georgian pronunciation is [baɡratiʼɔni] bug-rut-ee-O-nee, with no significant stress.
Quotes about Bagration
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- Sawyer, Thomas. "Mr.". Writer. Retrieved 9 August 2013.
- kartli5. Royalark.net. Retrieved on 2011-10-29.
- Pyotr Bagration – Russiapedia Military Prominent Russians. Russiapedia.rt.com (1908-10-29). Retrieved on 2011-10-29.
- Lê Vinh Quốc (chủ biên), Nguyễn Thị Thư, Lê Phụng Hoàng, Các nhân vật Lịch sử Cận đại, Tập II: Nga. NXB Giáo dục, Tp. Hồ Chí Minh 1997. Invalid language code.
-  Chapter XI: "Withdrawal from Smolensk & a Change of High Command"
- Geschichte des vaterländischen Krieges im Jahre 1812, Volume 2, p. 201, at Google Books
- О Багратионе Наполеон высказался в разговоре с Балашовым в самом начале войны 1812 года Генералов хороших у России нет, кроме одного Багратиона
- Отечественная война 1812 года. Вторжение Наполеона в Россию
- Peter Bagration Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (I) Chapter II
- 5 ЦАРЬ И ЕГО ГЕНЕРАЛЫ Мухин Ю.И.
- Когинов, Юрий "Бог рати он: роман" p. 97
- Isaak Khazan, Irina Khaytman "Boi poslednego gladiatora: roman i povesti" p. 184
- Alexander Mikaberidze, The Lion of the Russian Army: Life and Military Career of Prince General Peter Bagration, 2 volumes, (doct. diss., Florida State University, 2003)
- General Bagration: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, pod redaktsiei S.N. Golubova [General Bagration: Compilation of Documents and Materials], (Moscow, 1945)
- Bagration v Dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh: Sbornik Dokumentov [Bagration in the Danubian Principalities: Compilation of Documents], (Chisineu, 1949)
- Tsintsadze, Zurab, Bagration Voennaia Deiatelnost General Petra Ivanovicha Bagrationa, 1782–1812, [Military Career of General Peter Ivanovich Bagration, 1782–1812] (Moscow, 1997);
- V. Gribanov, Bagration v Peterburge [Bagration in St. Petersburg] (Leningrad 1979)
- I.I. Rostunov. "P.I. Bagration" (a monograph), Moscow, 1947 (in Russian)
- T. Lomouri. "Petre Bagrationi" (a monograph), Tbilisi, 1946 (in Georgian)
- N. Nakashidze. "Hero of Borodino", Tbilisi, 1961 (in Georgian)
|40x40px||Wikimedia Commons has media related to Pyotr Bagration.|
|40x40px||Wikisource has the text of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article Bagration, Peter, Prince.|
- Alexander Mikaberidze's biography of Prince Bagration
- Marek, Miroslav. "Genealogical account of Bagration's family". Genealogy.EU.
- Napoleon, His Army and Enemies
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